



T7 Communiqué

Cooperation in a brutal world

June 2026

Context: rising tensions, the need for concerted action and expectations of the G7

The international environment is becoming increasingly challenging on several fronts. Conflicts are multiplying, as illustrated by the war in Ukraine, the conflicts in the Middle East and tensions in the Sahel. At the same time, growing economic competition between major powers is leading to a rise in protectionist measures—tariffs, export controls and investment regulations. Furthermore, climate-related disasters are exacerbating these trends and posing significant risks to value chains. Finally, the rapid development of artificial intelligence is creating new forms of dependence on a small number of players.

The consequences of conflicts and tensions serve as a reminder of the deep interdependencies within the global economy. Even the major powers are dependent on production chains, disruptions in the commodities markets, financial crises, environmental pollution and, more generally, decisions taken beyond their borders. The challenge for G7 countries is not to break free from these interdependencies—which would be as costly as it is illusory—but to assess them and respond *through* international cooperation in order to prevent national strategies from leading to collectively sub-optimal outcomes. Thus, a significant part of the G7's response to these challenges involves enhanced coordination with partners whose industrial, technological and financial choices now directly shape the global economy.

More than fifty years after its establishment in 1975 to address the crisis triggered by the oil shocks, the G7 has seen its members' share of global GDP decline over time, falling from around 60% in 1980 to around 45% in 2025, according to IMF figures¹. At the same time, the share of the BRICS countries has risen and now accounts for nearly 25% of global GDP. Nevertheless, the G7's influence remains significant and expectations of its members are high—particularly on issues of development aid², economic security, trade governance and the dissemination of critical technologies³.

G7 leadership cannot be exercised in isolation. The G7's declining share of global GDP, combined with the growing economic, technological and industrial strength of the major emerging economies, requires the G7 to build bridges with other partners—first and foremost among G20 economies, in the Indo-Pacific region and with the Global South.

A reminder of France's priorities and a presentation of the four pillars as areas where G7 action is expected

France has set out two priorities for its G7 presidency. Firstly, the reduction of global imbalances—understood in a broad sense, encompassing imbalances linked to new industrial policies, technological developments linked to the deployment of artificial intelligence (AI), and imbalances in value chains for critical raw materials. Secondly, reforming development finance, based on mutually beneficial partnerships with partner countries, better mobilisation of domestic resources, and stronger coordination between official development assistance, multilateral development finance and private investment.

The work of Think7 (T7), the G7's official engagement group for *think tanks* and research centres, has worked at the intersection of these two priorities. The 50 or so *think tanks* from G7 countries and beyond involved in the T7 have set about addressing the challenges of cooperation in the face of tensions created by new industrial policies, imbalances in opportunities for sustainable development, the coordination of economic security measures, and issues related to innovation and AI.

These four themes are interlinked. The coordination of industrial policies and economic security form the basis of an agenda for economic stability: the former aims to reduce friction between major economies over critical minerals and investment agreements; the latter seeks to coordinate the growing use of economic tools to achieve geopolitical objectives (export controls, screening of inward investment, financial sanctions). The future of

1 World Economic Outlook (April 2026)—GDP, current prices

2 The G7 accounts for 75% of total development aid. Its members hold, on average, 40% of the voting rights in the major multilateral development banks and 40% of the global assets of public development banks.

3 The global supply chain for semiconductor manufacturing equipment is thus concentrated almost exclusively within the G7 economies and their close partners, giving the group unique leverage.

development finance and innovation/AI contribute to the ‘development’ priority by establishing a renewed partnership with countries in the Global South—whether by better structuring concessional and private flows, or by ensuring equitable access to AI models.

1. The coordination of industrial policies

In response to the major transitions currently underway and the opportunities they present, the world’s major economies have renewed their focus on industrial policy and are competing to capture markets and secure jobs and value. Some form of coordination among the major economies on key aspects of these industrial policies would serve as a stabilising factor.

A key area is that of *secure, responsible and fair value chains for critical minerals*, which are both a source of friction but also of opportunities that countries are seeking to capitalise on. This is an area where sustainable security requires cooperation between producers and importers throughout the value chains. The T7 makes three recommendations in this regard⁴: 1) pursue a political agreement on critical minerals that strengthens dialogue on inclusive and responsible mineral value chains and reconciles the interests of producer and consumer countries; 2) launch a small number of high-profile pilot investment projects that demonstrate the feasibility of commercially viable and socially responsible value chains for critical minerals; 3) enhance the circularity of critical minerals by embedding circular solutions within existing frameworks such as the G7 Alliance on Resource Efficiency and the Principles of the Circular Economy and Resource Efficiency.

Given the proliferation of investment (and trade) instruments and agreements aimed at securing value chains, and the concentration of foreign direct investment flows, there is a need to ensure that investment agreements are more closely aligned with countries’ economic, social and environmental development objectives, whether or not they are G7 members. The T7 recommends⁵ that: 1) the international investment governance framework be strengthened in a context of fragmentation and the obsolescence of existing tools; 2) the investment governance toolkit be expanded; 3)

implementation and enabling conditions be improved; 4) G7 partnerships and peer learning be strengthened.

2. The future of development finance

The traditional approach to financing sustainable development is in need of radical reform. The challenge for the G7 countries—long-standing providers of ODA—is to forge new alliances based on a better understanding of partner countries’ needs and on shared criteria for effectiveness and impact.

The development finance ecosystem must, in particular, evolve to accommodate the growing number of stakeholders, become more effective and efficient, in order to manage increasingly limited concessional funds and strengthen links with the private finance sector. Within this ecosystem, public development banks must form a more effective system. With this in mind, T7 makes recommendations⁶: 1) on tools to enhance these banks’ contribution to the ecosystem, by better integrating project preparation and implementation processes; and 2) to reduce costs and financial risks for emerging markets and developing economies by improving access to vertical funds and developing an integrated financing package.

The increasing frequency of natural disasters is rendering certain regions—including some within G7 countries—partially or entirely ‘uninsurable’. This crisis threatens both the economic stability (particularly fiscal stability) of G7 countries and the resilience of vulnerable countries. To address this, the T7 recommends⁷ that: 1) tools be developed and shared to improve international understanding of physical risk profiles; 2) the conditions for a fair and effective distribution of costs between the public and private sectors be reviewed; and 3) opportunities for insurability and investment in vulnerable countries be strengthened.

Financial commitments to biodiversity remain limited and difficult to compare, but nature reporting frameworks are becoming increasingly widespread, particularly in major Asian economies. T7 recommends that the G7 take action on three fronts⁸: 1) shift mindsets to view nature financing as an opportunity rather than a cost; 2) strengthen public investment *through* an operational standard of ‘do no significant harm to biodiversity’ for public

4 **Secure, responsible and equitable critical minerals value chains**

5 **Strengthening coherence between investment agreements and environmental, social and economic objectives**

6 **Towards a more effective and integrated Public Development Bank system**

7 **Insurability against natural disasters**

8 **Standardising and strengthening biodiversity finance**

finances and multilateral development banks; and 3) promote common reporting standards (TNFD, GRI, ISSB) as well as the financing of global natural commons such as tropical forests.

3. Coordination of economic security measures

The proliferation of economic security measures within the G7 has created loopholes exploited by illicit networks, whilst increasing costs for the private sector and undermining public confidence. To address this, the T7 proposes to strengthen coordination, in particular by combating ghost fleets and harmonising export controls on advanced technologies. Economic security also requires mapping critical dependencies and adopting common standards to reduce vulnerabilities.

Strengthening export controls and combating the circumvention of western sanctions is a key priority. In the field of maritime transport, the proliferation of vessels operating without a valid flag or lawful insurance—the ‘ghost fleet’—undermines the effectiveness of international sanctions, poses major environmental risks and serves as a vehicle for hybrid tactics whose consequences directly affect coastal states. With regard to export controls on advanced technologies, existing systems within the G7 remain disparate in terms of scope and operational resources—creating blind spots that illicit networks are increasingly exploiting, notably *through* remote access to the most advanced computing capabilities via the cloud, thereby circumventing the effectiveness of controls on physical components. The T7 makes three recommendations⁹: 1) strengthen the monitoring of ghost fleets (through data exchanges and insurance requirements for all vessels transiting via G7 waters); 2) develop a common set of capabilities for G7 export control regimes, covering intangible transfers; 3) create a coordinated G7+ framework for export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment, notably incorporating South Korea and the Netherlands.

Economic security also depends on the ability of G7 economies to map their shared dependencies, coordinate their standards and send consistent signals to markets and partner countries. The T7 sets out seven recommendations in this regard¹⁰: 1) map priority pharmaceutical dependencies; 2) establish binding G7 standards on critical raw materials; 3) support demand for

mature semiconductors manufactured within the G7; 4) create a G7 contact group on geoeconomic coercion; 5) establish a G7 platform to raise awareness of the long-term benefits of economic security; 6) harmonise G7 standards on economic security tools (investment screening, export controls, local content requirements); 7) establish an Indo-Pacific economic security pillar (G7+) with Australia and South Korea.

4. Innovation and AI

Innovation is the main driver of long-term growth in the G7 economies, but the uptake of some frontier technologies remains patchy. At the same time, the development of AI risks exacerbating tensions: the unprecedented concentration of resources is creating systemic vulnerabilities for G7 countries and a risk of a global divide.

Five key challenges determine the ability of G7 economies to translate innovation into long-term inclusive growth: the lack of harmonised data on technology diffusion; insufficient support for SMEs in adopting cutting-edge technologies; the growing exposure of supply chains to natural disasters and climate-related shocks; vulnerabilities in supply chains for critical raw materials, exacerbated by the concentration of processing capacity; and the lack of structured coordination on quantum technologies. The T7 sets out seven recommendations to address these issues¹¹: 1) establish a G7 mechanism to measure technology diffusion; 2) define G7 standards for financial support to SMEs adopting cutting-edge technologies; 3) create a G7 mechanism to monitor supply chain vulnerabilities linked to natural disasters or conflicts; 4) integrate supply and demand policies for critical raw materials produced within the G7; 5) build up G7 stocks of critical raw materials; 6) map G7 reserves of critical raw materials; 7) establish a G7 working group on quantum technologies.

9 Economic security: lessons learnt and challenges

10 Economic security: boosting collaboration

11 Innovation and investment

The development of artificial intelligence risks fuelling a global digital divide: many countries in the Global South face inadequate digital infrastructure, limited access to data and a limited capacity to develop solutions tailored to their needs, leaving them exposed to AI-induced disruptions without viable alternatives. The work of the Hiroshima Process has laid the foundations for a common approach within the G7; the T7 proposes to build on these, operationalise principles and link them to ongoing multilateral initiatives through eight recommendations¹²: 1) ensure secure and sustainable global access to critical layers of AI (computing, data, models, platforms); 2) recognise countries in the Global South as active partners in AI

capacity building; 3) diversify public investment towards lightweight, open and sector-specific models for government use; 4) align G7 positions with UN initiatives (Independent Scientific Panel, Global Dialogue on AI); 5) adopt common guidelines for public procurement in AI (transparency, portability, interoperability); 6) launch a multinational partnership on cutting-edge AI, starting with a shared computing cluster for research in the public interest; 7) strengthen G7 monitoring of AI-related risks and the Hiroshima Process; 8) promote a cross-border ecosystem for AI talent and research (multinational hubs, short-term mobility schemes, a dedicated G7 visa).

ABOUT THINK7

Think7 (T7) is the official G7 engagement group bringing together leading think tanks and research centres to provide practical, evidence-based recommendations to G7 decision-makers.

In 2026, IDDRI and the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) are jointly coordinating the T7 process for the French G7 Presidency.

The T7 serves as both a forum for expert inputs in the G7 and a space for inclusive dialogue with partner countries, bringing together around 60 organisations from G7 members plus Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey, Kenya, Switzerland and Spain.

ABOUT IDDRI & ECFR

IDDRI is an international think tank dedicated to sustainable development. Guided by the vision of a society that ensures prosperity for all—in both the Global North and South—while staying within the planet’s environmental boundaries, IDDRI identifies and promotes pathways to achieve this ambition through international cooperation and European policymaking. Grounded in science, the institute fosters dialogue among stakeholders and works in partnership with a wide network of organizations around the world.

The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) is an award-winning international think-tank that aims to conduct cutting-edge independent research on European foreign and security policy and to provide a safe meeting space for decision-makers, activists and influencers to share ideas. ECFR builds coalitions for change at the European level and promotes informed debate about Europe’s role in the world.

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T7 Task Forces composition and deliverables are available at **Think 7 | IDDRI**, **Think 7 | ECFR** and **think7-2026.org**.

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